In this paper, we analyze the careers from a sample of more than 1,000 top French chefs over more than twenty years and link it to the success or reputation of the restaurants where they have worked. This allows us to test what are the determinants of success but also to investigate the dynamics of performance and reputation, stressing the importance of the quality of apprenticeships, mentoring and entrepreneurship spirit. We find that the prestige of the restaurant where individuals work is on average declining along the career, and that the quality of apprenticeship is strongly related to the future success as chef. We also find that prices of restaurants with higher reputation are more sensitive to bad signals.
Introduction
For most chefs, having his restaurant being awarded one or more stars in the famous Michelin Guide Rouge represents a major achievement, a recognition of their work, and also increased notoriety generating a significant stream of future revenues. In this specific industry, experts play a decisive role, and reputation of restaurants and chefs are basically established according to their opinions. The aim of this paper is to analyze how these reputations are made and unmade and to understand better the development of careers in this highly creative occupation. Thanks to the richness of our dataset, we are able to observe the birth of a "star" and its evolution in the constellation of stars forming the French gastronomic scene.
We first describe the typical career of a chef, explaining the different stages of the career and looking at the determinants of performance along the career. We find that careers follow a particular path. At an earlier stage of their career, after graduating from a culinary school, individuals learn the untaught tricks of the profession by assisting different accomplished chefs at various stages of the meal preparation, starting as commis de cuisine, then chef de partie and then second de cuisine, or main assistant. This apprenticeship process is nicknamed Tour de France as young chefs travel through the country and sometimes beyond to improve their knowledge and benefit from various experiences at the best restaurants. We show that the quality of the restaurant where an individual works on average declines over the career. In other words, individuals start their careers in restaurants with the highest reputation, and gradually move to restaurants with a lower reputation along their apprenticeship. At the end of this apprenticeship, they usually start they own restaurant starting from scratch, and gradually build their own reputation.
We are especially interested in the process of initial accumulation of human capital. We use a quality-weighted measure of apprenticeship human capital measuring the quality of the apprenticeship received during the early stage of the career, and measure its effect on the determinants of later success. We find that these measures of accumulated human capital are a key determinant of the performance as chef de cuisine. The quality of apprenticeship appears to be particularly important at an intermediate level (chef de partie) and, to a less extent, at the end of the apprenticeship (second de cuisine).
We then measure the consequences of reaching the stars. We estimate hedonic price regressions and find that an additional star translates into a 15% price increase for a typical menu. We also estimate a regression in first difference, looking at the change in price associated with a change in stars. While the overall effect is positive, we find that the effect is stronger the higher was the prestige of the restaurant the previous year, and also that change in prices are more sensitive to downgradings than to upgradings. The first result is in line with the theoretical predictions from models of reputation like Diamond (1989) .
We contribute to three very different strands of the literature. First, a long tradition in labor economics has investigated individual careers and the dynamics of productivity over the career. Starting with the theoretical work of Becker, Mincer and Ben-Porath on human capital, the literature on learning (Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Farber and Gibbons, 1996) , or on career concerns (Holmström, 1982) , and more recently on careers in organizations (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999a,b) , these authors have tried to understand what is driving careers.
Empirical work has attempted to validate some key predictions of some of these theories using personal information from mutual fund managers Section 2 describes the construction of the dataset and provides some summary statistics. Sections 3 details our empirical methodology, while section 4 shows our results. Section 5 concludes and provides suggestions for future research. The first source associates the name of the chef to name of the restaurant, its location, a clear description of the career similar to a vitae (i.e. which type of job at which restaurant over which period of time), as well as other individual information such as the gender, the date of birth, the type of education (the different types of degrees obtained and the date of graduation), information about apprenticeships, and whether he learned by itself (autodidacte). The second source provides, associated to the name of the restaurant, the location, presence of an hotel, the minimum and maximum prices for a menu, and also a remark as to whether it is necessary or advised to call in advance. More importantly, it provides for each restaurant ranked by Michelin two measures of quality: the quality of the food as measured by the number of stars (on a scale from 0 to 3), and the quality or luxury of the setting as measured by the number (and color) of forks (or houses), on a scale from 0 to 5. Chefs from restaurants with at least one star are also asked to indicate three recipes among their specialties. We then merged the two datasets by location, restaurant and by year. Table 1 shows the number of individuals working in Michelin starred restaurants by year. By construction, our dataset contains a succession of new cohorts arriving on the market and a few incumbents who were already chefs before 1980.
The job structure in the industry is very clearly defined and hierarchical. At the top of the hierarchy are the chefs. They are assisted by their second de cuisine. Lower in the hierarchy are chef de partie and commis de cuisine, who assist at different stages of the process. Table 2 shows the evolution of the distribution of jobs over our period of analysis. Again, by construction, we see that the proportion of chefs and, to a lower extent, of seconds de cuisine is increasing with time, while the proportion of chef de partie and commis de cuisine is declining.
Concentrating on the firm/restaurant side, Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average price (not controlling for inflation) and the price ratio between restaurant categories. We can clearly see that the price difference between 3-stars restaurant and the other categories increases gradually, suggesting a superstar effect. Table 3 shows the transition matrix in and out of the Michelin guide, as well as the star transition. We observe that there is more upward mobility (probably as a consequence of our sample selection) and also quite a lot of persistence. Persistence is also much higher at the top than at the bottom 1 .
3 Empirical Methodology and Results
Stylized facts about prestige of the restaurant and career dynamics
We start by linking the prestige of the restaurant to the career dynamics. Table 4 shows the percentage of individuals working in different subsets of restaurants ranked by quality at various stages of their careers. A striking pattern is that the prestige of the restaurant is higher at the beginning of the career: commis de cuisine and chefs de partie work on average in higherquality restaurants than seconds de cuisine, themselves working in higherquality restaurants than chef de cuisine This should come as no surprise as individuals at the beginning of their career tour the best restaurants in the country, learning the techniques from the most famous chefs. This fact can partly be explained by the selective nature of our sample. However, it also provides an interesting description of the typical pattern regarding 1 See Schumacher (2009) for a theoretical motivation.
6 career dynamics and reputation building for our subset of highly talented individuals: after learning from all these top chefs, individuals start from scratch, become chefs themselves and start with no reputation. We turn next to what can explain their success of their restaurant once they become chef.
Effect of "apprenticeship human capital"
In the second part, we only consider the subset of individuals who have reached the level of chef and try to understand which factors affect their performance, or the prestige of the restaurant they work at. In particular, we stress the importance of the quality of the apprenticeship human capital accumulated at the earlier stage of the career. As we have just seen in the previous step, individuals spend their apprenticeship learning in the restaurants with well established reputation. Obviously, some are more lucky or talented than others and end up in better places. So how does the quality of the restaurant where you worked as commis de cuisine, chef de partie or second de cuisine affects your success as a chef? To study this, we create a measure of quality weighted accumulation of apprenticeship human capital by summing the number of stars accumulated over the years at the various stages of your career. We then look at the effect of this variable on performance as a chef: Tables 5 to 7 show the results. It appears that the quality of apprenticeship has an important effect on performance, as the stars accumulated, especially as chef de partie, impacts on the presence in the Michelin and the number of stars as a chef. This could indicate either that there is a selection between individuals to be selected as chef de partie in the best restaurants, or/and that you need to be sufficiently close to the chef to really learn from him, what might not be the case as commis de cuisine. Finally, the fact that the number of stars accumulated as second de cuisine is only significant in one specification could be linked to the different career choices that individuals make, as some individuals might wait a long time as second de cuisine that the chef retires to take over the restaurant, while others would start rapidly on their own. We study that decision more carefully in a companion paper.
Hedonic price regressions
As a third part, we measure the consequence of reaching the stars and link the average price of a menu to the number of stars awarded to the restaurant, We also look at the effect of the quality of the setting on the average price charged.
log P it = g(Stars, F orks, Location)
In table 8 ,we find that, on average, an extra star is associated with a 15% price increase, reflecting the increased value the consumer is expected to receive in his plate. The quality of the setting is also associated with higher price.
We next analyze more precisely the dynamic relationship between price and performance, stressing the importance of reputation. We test change in performance should matter differently whether you were a three stars restaurant or a restaurant with no star. We run a simple first difference regression between the change in price and the change in stars, as well as the interaction between the change in stars and the past reputation of the restaurant, and the interaction between the change in stars and the type of change (positive or negative assessment):
d log P it = dStars it + dStars it * P ositive + dStars it * Re putation i(t−1) Table 9 shows the results. We find that the relationship between a change in performance and a change in price is much stronger at the top of the prestige ladder than at the bottom. In others words, a bad signal is much more costly when a firm has acquired a high level of reputation, in line with the theoretical predictions from several models of reputation like Diamond (1989) . We also find that change in prices are more sensitive to downgradings than to upgradings.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the career patterns of a subset of top French chefs. We described a few stylized facts about this specific labor markets: the quality of the workplace is on average higher at the beginning of the career. This is consistent with the idea that individuals acquire human capital on the job and then start their own firm from scratch using the tools they have learned by observing the best chefs at work. We then tested whether this reputational human capital had an impact on future performance. Our results confirmed our prior that the quality of the restaurant where individuals learned the profession had a significant impact on the probability to enter in the Michelin and acquire highly valuable stars. We also analyzed the pricing patterns of restaurants. We found that prices were more sensitive to bad signals for restaurants of higher quality. As such, our paper contributes to the understanding of the dynamics of reputation. Note: see table 6 20
